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United States . . .”,4), the statute that governs the collection of debts owed to the federal 
government.  
 A central issue in interpreting these provisions is how broadly to define “property.”   
Recent decisions addressed this point in a situation where the debtor disclaimed assets that were 
coming to a debtor from another source, typically money receivable upon the death of a wealthy 
relative. The effect of the disclaimer would be to fully renounce the debtor’s interest in the 
property and the assets would pass to the next beneficiary. The courts considered whether such a 
renunciation amounts to a fraudulent transfer of “property” that can be avoided by the creditor as 
a fraudulent conveyance. 
 The courts have applied different standards to the same transaction, depending on the 
statute involved. Specifically, the courts have drawn a distinction between the Bankruptcy Code 
and other statutes.  This memorandum will explore this distinction in a three-fold approach. Part 
I will demonstrate that courts adopt a broad interpretation of property in the tax lien context. Part 
II will establish that a similarly broad definition has been embraced under the FDCPA. And Part 
III discusses the narrow definition of property followed by the courts in the bankruptcy context 
and the rationale for a different standard under the Code.   
I. A Disclaimer Is A Fraudulent Transfer Under The Federal Tax Laws  
 Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: “If any person liable to pay any tax 
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the 
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to 
                                                
4 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a) 2012).  
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such person.”5 The language in section 6321 “is broad and reveals on its face that Congress 
meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have.” 6 
 The question of whether a taxpayer’s asset constitutes “property” or “rights to property” 
is a matter of federal law.7 However, “property” and “right to property” are not defined in the tax 
code.8 Instead, the Supreme Court announced a two-prong test to determine if an asset is 
property under the tax code.9 First, we look to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has 
in the property. Id. The Court reasoned that we should look to state law–not federal law– to 
determine his right in the property because “[s]tate law creates legal interests and rights” while 
the federal tax law merely “designate[s] what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.”10 
Having determined the extent of the power of the taxpayer in the property, we then look to 
federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as “property” or 
“rights to property” within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.11  
 The Supreme Court did not delineate what state rights are property under federal law but 
did emphasize that control over the property is central.  “The important consideration is the 
breadth of the control the [taxpayer] could exercise over the property.”12 Several appellate courts 
have held that property would encompass any “state-law rights or interests that have pecuniary 
value and are transferable.”13 Accordingly, to satisfy a tax delinquency, the federal government 
may collect property as long as the taxpayer had control over it or it had pecuniary value and is 
                                                
5 26 U.S.C. § 6321. 
6 United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719–20 (1985) (internal citations omitted). 
7 Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (quoting Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 727). 
8 See Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 1998). 
9 Drye, 528 U.S. at 49.   
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Dyre, 528 U.S. at 61 (citing Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 83 (1940)) (holding that the right to disclaim 
inheritance under state law was “right to property” under federal law because the disclaimant could use that power 
to channel the inheritance to a known heir). 
13 Drye Family 1995 Trust, 152 F.3d at 895 (citing decisions from the 3rd., 6th, 9th, and 11th circuits). 
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transferrable regardless if under state law other creditors would not be able to reach that 
property. Thus, the federal government and the ordinary creditor have different standards 
regarding which transferred out property they are able to reach. 
 For example, in Nat’l Bank of Commerce, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer’s right 
under state law to withdraw all of the funds in a joint bank account constitutes “property” or the 
“righ[t] to property” subject to levy for unpaid federal taxes, although state law would not allow 
ordinary creditors to deplete the account.14 Similarly, the Court held that a taxpayer’s right under 
a life insurance policy to compel his insurer to pay him the cash surrender value qualifies as 
“property” or a “righ[t] to property” subject to attachment for unpaid federal taxes, although state 
law shielded the cash surrender value from creditors’ liens.15  
II. Disclaimed Assets Are Not Shielded From Collection By The United States 
 The FDCPA, the statute governing the collection of debt owed, allows the government to 
void a fraudulent transfer by a debtor owing a debt to the United States.16 The FDCPA is similar 
to the federal tax lien statute because it “create[s] a comprehensive statutory framework for the 
collection of debts owed to the United States government,” which parallels the aims of the tax 
code.17 Further, like the federal tax lien statute, the FDCPA “itself creates no property rights but 
merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.”18  
 To determine what is a fraudulent transfer under the FDCPA–and by extension, what is 
property under the FDCPA–courts apply the Drye standard announced by the Supreme Court in 
                                                
14 Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 723–27. 
15 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1958). 
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a). 
17 United Stated v. Bensal, 853 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178, 1183 
(9th Cir. 2008)). 
18 United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002). 
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the tax lien context.19 Under this framework, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
disclaimer of an inheritance by a debtor who owed money to the federal government was a 
fraudulent transfer under the FDCPA because under state law he could channel that money to a 
known heir, just as it would have been reachable under the tax lien statute.20 In another case, the 
Second Circuit held that the government cannot collect money that was being held by an 
intermediary bank in an electronic fund transfer when the originator or the intended beneficiary 
owed a debt the government.21 Since neither party at either end of the transaction could control 
or direct those funds, neither had an interest or right in it under state law and was therefore not a 
fraudulent transfer under the FDCPA.22  
III. Disclaimed Assets Under Section 548 Of The Bankruptcy Code 
 Under the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he trustee may avoid any transfer ... of an interest of the 
debtor in property ... that was made ... within two years before the date of the filing of the 
petition . . .” where the transfer involved actual or constructive fraud.23 The Code does not define 
“property” or “an interest ... in property.”24 Rather, “Congress has generally left the 
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law,”25, meaning that 
“[i]n the absence of any controlling federal law, ‘property’ and ‘interests in property’ are 
creatures of state law.”26  
                                                
19 See Bensal, 853 F.3d at 1000; Export-Import Bank of U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd., 609 F.3d 111 (2d. Cir. 
2010). 
20 Bensal, 853 F.3d at 1000. 
21 Export-Import Bank, 609 F.3d at 122. 
22 Id. 
23 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 
24 In re Costas, 555 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2006).   
25 id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)) 
26 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992). 
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 Unlike the tax lien statute and the FDCPA, courts do not look to the Drye standard to 
determine “property” under section 548.27 Rather, courts apply the Butner rule under which not 
only is the definition of property governed by state law, but the “determination of property rights 
in the assets of a bankrupt's estate” is controlled by state law as well.28  In other words, even if an 
asset is “property” under state law and that property was transferred out of the bankrupt’s estate, 
if state law shields that property from creditors, it will not be a fraudulent transfer under section 
548.  
 This standard to evaluate fraudulent transfers has been adopted by other courts as well. 
See In re Laughlin, 602 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a Chapter 7 petitioner’s pre-
petition renunciation of an inheritance was shielded from creditors under state law and therefore 
was not a fraudulent transfer under section 548 of the Code as well); In re Atchison, 925 F.2d 
209 (7th. Cir. 1991); In re Sanford, 369 B.R. 609 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007). 
 For example, in Costas, Rachel Costas disclaimed a $34,000 interest in her father’s 
trust.29 Three weeks later, she filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Code.30 
The Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid the disclaimer as a fraudulent transfer under section 548.31 
The court held that since Arizona law provided that disclaimed assets are protected from 
creditors (“Az.Rev.Stat. § 14-2801(G) . . . is a legal fiction that retroactively eliminates any 
property interest that a disclaimant previously held in the disclaimed property,” id. at 793-94), 
                                                
27 Costas, 555 F.3d at 795-96. 
28 See Costas, 555 F.3d, at 797 ([i]nstead, we apply the principles of Butner and hold that a disclaimer, properly 
executed under Arizona law, is not a “transfer ... of an interest of the debtor in property” for purposes of section 
548). 
29 Id. at 792. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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the disclaimer was not a fraudulent transfer under section 548 even though the right to disclaim 
is a property interest under state law.  
 In drawing a distinction between the Bankruptcy Code and other federal statutes, the 
Costas court emphasized several considerations. First, it noted that the policy underlying the tax 
lien statute and the FDCPA–to facilitate the collection of debt owed to the government–contrasts 
sharply with the policy of the code.32 The Bankruptcy Code “largely respects substantive state 
law rights, neither granting a creditor new rights in the debtor's property nor taking any away.”33 
Therefore, while it may be justified that the government can collect its debt from funds that state 
law would otherwise protect, no such compulsion exists in the bankruptcy context.  
 Further, the court identified a goal of achieving “[u]niform treatment of property interests 
by both state and federal courts within a State....”34 Extending the Drye rule to the bankruptcy 
context creates different standards of protection from creditors under state and federal law. 
Disparate treatment of creditors would undermine this goal of uniformity.35  
 Finally, the court noted that while the tax lien statute only permits a narrow range of 
exemptions from “property,” indicating that that term should interpreted broadly, the Code 
delineates a broad range of exceptions36, suggesting an intent of allowing a debtor to take 
advantage of all available state law exemptions.37  
 
 
                                                
32 Id. at 797. 
33 Id. (citing Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Rev., 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)). 
34 Id. (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 55). 
35 Id. 
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012).  
37 Id. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 While courts have adopted an expansive view of fraudulent conveyance provisions of 
several federal statutes, they have interpreted the same provision of the Bankruptcy Code more 
narrowly, affording the debtor all the protections that he would have received under state law.  
 
 
 
